Montana\u27s Rape-Shield Statute: No Time to Waste! by McGuinness, James G.
Montana Law Review
Volume 52
Issue 1 Winter 1991 Article 8
January 1991
Montana's Rape-Shield Statute: No Time to Waste!
James G. McGuinness
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
James G. McGuinness, Montana's Rape-Shield Statute: No Time to Waste!, 52 Mont. L. Rev. (1991).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/8
COMMENTS
MONTANA'S RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE: NO TIME
TO WASTE!
James G. McGuinness*
Then call them to our presence-face to face, and frowning brow




Mr. X is on trial in a Montana court charged with sexual in-
tercourse without consent. Mr. X's attorney wishes to introduce
evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of his accuser. The
state objects and the following dialogue2 ensues:
Defense: Your Honor, the state elicited testimony from the com-
plainant showing her lack of sexual experience before the alleged
incident. The evidence we want to introduce directly refutes this
impression of naivete the state has placed in the jury's mind.
State: Your Honor, Montana's rape-shield statute squarely pro-
hibits the defendant's evidence concerning the victim's past sex-
ual conduct. The statute governs the use of past sexual conduct
evidence in all sexual crime cases by generally prohibiting this
type of evidence.' Although the statute grants two narrow excep-
* The author wishes to thank Professor Larry M. Elison. Any errors or omissions, how-
ever, are strictly the author's alone.
1. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (quoting SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD II,
act 1, scene 1).
2. The introductory dialogue is based on the facts of State v. Calbero, 71 Haw. 115,
785 P.2d 157 (1989).
3. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4) (1990). The provisions of Montana Code Annotated
section 45-5-511(4) are applicable to all sex crimes. The specific rape-shield provisions state:
(4) No evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim is admissible in
prosecutions under this part except:
(a) evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the offender;
1
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tions, neither exception allows past sexual conduct evidence for
the purpose to which the defense alludes.
Defense: Your Honor, the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution, however, guarantees the accused the right to con-
front his accuser, including the right to rigorous cross-
examination.
Court: The court sustains the state's objection under Montana
Code Annotated section 45-5-511(4) (Montana's Rape-Shield
Statute).
The above confrontation between the state and the defense at-
torney highlights two competing interests: (1) the state's interest in
protecting the complainant, and (2) the defendant's right to con-
front his accuser. Confrontations similar to the above hypothetical
have forced courts throughout the country to reexamine the consti-
tutionality of their rape-shield statutes.
This article examines Montana's Rape-Shield Statute to reveal
both its inadequacies and its virtues. First, an overview on rape-
shield law explains why rape victims need special protection. Sec-
ond, the article analyzes the structure of Montana's Rape-Shield
Statute by comparing it with federal rape-shield law. Next, a sur-
vey of Montana case law demonstrates the Montana Supreme
Court's application of Montana's Rape-Shield Statute to particular
factual scenarios. In addition, an analysis of case law from other
jurisdictions, involving constitutional attacks upon their rape-
shield statutes, reveals potential problems to avoid in Montana. Fi-
nally, the article synthesizes the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of two general approaches used in the cases from other juris-
dictions. This synthesis culminates in a proposed statutory and
judicial scheme for Montana courts to use in the future if con-
fronted with attacks on Montana's Rape-Shield Statute.
II. OVERVIEW
Until recently, courts routinely admitted almost all evidence
of the complainant's past sexual conduct offered by the defendant
in a rape case." Indeed, courts allowed the defense to use evidence
(b) evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity to show the
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease which is at issue in the prosecution.
(5) If the defendant proposes for any purpose to offer evidence described in
subsection (4)(a) or (4)(b), the trial judge shall order a hearing out of the presence
of the jury to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under sub-
section (4).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4), (5) (1989).
4. Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws And The Sixth Amendment, 128 U.
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to impeach the victim's credibility that the state could not use to
impeach the defendant's credibility.5 This judicial attitude re-
sulted from the widespread belief, among a largely male-dominated
legal community, that evidence offered in a rape case suggesting
the complainant was promiscuous naturally bore on the element of
consent and the general credibility of the victim.' Judges believed
that a woman with an active sexual past would more likely consent
to the sexual advances of the defendant. Today, however, the law
reflects a changing attitude. Humiliating attacks during a rape
trial, using a rape victim's past sexual conduct, serve only to in-
flame and distract the jury rather than contribute to the overall
purpose of the trial, namely, ascertaining facts.8 Consequently, all
but two states developed rape-shield statutes to protect the rape
victim by prohibiting harassing questions about her past sexual
conduct.
These rape-shield statutes subject evidence involving the com-
plainant's past sexual conduct to a special admissibility test. The
evidence must pass the test before judges can admit the evidence
at trial. The statutes either generally prohibit past sexual conduct
evidence, followed by a list of exceptions, 0 or require the court to
balance the probative value of the past sexual conduct evidence
against the evidence's prejudicial effect." The more prohibitive the
statute, the more susceptible the statute is to constitutional chal-
lenges by the defense. Because this article focuses on Montana law
in the area of rape-shield protection, it is necessary to analyze both
the content of Montana's Rape-Shield Statute and the judicial
gloss added by Montana case law to determine the statute's poten-
tial for serious constitutional challenges.
PA. L. REV. 544, 546 (1979-80).
5. Id. at 549.
6. Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases In The Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1977).
7. Id. at 10.
8. State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, 34, 487 N.E.2d 560, 561 (1986).
9. Although Utah and Arizona do not have rape-shield statutes, both states provide
protection for the victim by case law. See State v. Oliver, 158 Ariz. 22, 760 P.2d 1071 (1988);
State v. Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987).
10. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-42-101 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86f (1989);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Baldwin 1988);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520j (1990); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 48.069, 48.035 (Michie 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 (West 1987); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-16 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. § 3255 (1989); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1989).
1991]
3
McGuinness: MONTANA'S RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE: NO TIME TO WASTE!
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1991
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
III. MONTANA'S RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE: THE ORIGINS
In 1975, the legislature amended section 94-5-503 of the Re-
vised Codes of Montana to prohibit evidence of the complainant's
past sexual conduct in a sexual intercourse without consent case.
In other words, the legislature provided rape-shield protection to
the complainant. 2 Before 1985, however, this protection extended
only to victims of sexual intercourse without consent. 3 In 1985,
Montana extended rape-shield protection to victims of all sexual
crimes.
14
In 1978, the United States Congress passed House Rule of Ev-
idence 412, now Federal Rule of Evidence 412, a strict evidentiary
rule that severely limits the instances when federal courts can ad-
mit evidence of a rape victim's past sexual conduct.' 5 Montana's
Rape-Shield Statute is essentially the same as Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 412.16 Both prohibit evidence of past sexual conduct in the
form of reputation or opinion evidence.' 7 Both the Montana and
federal rules allow evidence of specific acts of past sexual conduct
in two limited exceptions: (1) "evidence of specific instances of the
victim's sexual activity to show the origin of semen, pregnancy, or
disease which is at issue in the prosecution"'" and (2) "evidence of
the victim's past sexual conduct with the offender.'"
The federal rule contains an important constitutional safe-
guard for the defendant not found in Montana's Rape-Shield Stat-
ute.20 In explaining rule 412(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, Congressman Mann stated that specific instances of sexual
conduct are admitted under the federal rule "where because of an
unusual chain of circumstances, the general rule of inadmissibility,
12. REV. CODES. MONT. § 94-5-503(5)(a)(b) (1975) (redes. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
503(5) (1978)).
13. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(5) (1978).
14. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4) (1985).
15. HOUSE R. EviD. 412 (1978); FED. R. EvID. 412. The rule completely bans reputation
and opinion evidence in subsection (a). Subsection (b) bans specific instances of past sexual
conduct evidence unless: (1) it "is constitutionally required to be admitted; or" (2)(A) it is
evidence concerning the "source of semen or injury"; or (2)(B) it is evidence of the victim's
"past sexual" conduct "with the accused, offered ... upon the issue of consent." Id.
16. Compare supra note 15 with supra note 3.
17. FED. R. EVID. 412(a). See supra note 3 for the text of Montana Code Annotated
section 45-5-511(4)(b) (1990).
18. See supra note 3 for the text of Montana Code Annotated section 45-5-511(4)(b)
(1990). See also supra note 15 for the text of rule 412(B)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
19. See supra note 3 for the text of Montana Code Annotated section 45-5-511(4)(a)
(1990). See also supra note 15 for the text of rule 412(b)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
20. See supra note 15 for the text of rule 412(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
[Vol. 52
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if followed would result in denying the defendant a constitutional
right."21 The absence of this allowance in Montana's Rape-Shield
Statute, coupled with the statute's unequivocal ban on reputation
and opinion evidence, makes Montana's Rape-Shield Statute one
of the nation's most prohibitive.
'IV. MONTANA CASE LAW: No SERIOUS CHALLENGES
In the 1980s, the Montana Supreme Court reviewed several
cases specifically raising the issue of admissibility of past sexual
conduct evidence. In State v. Higley,22 the defendant was con-
victed of raping a woman in Bozeman.2 ' During the defendant's
trial, the defendant wished to introduce testimony from the vic-
tim's landlady concerning a conversation the landlady overheard
between the complainant and her roommate. According to the
landlady, the victim allegedly laughed when her roommate com-
mented to her, "Where are all of Bozeman's rapists? Linnie needs
to be raped again."'12 The defense also wanted to cross-examine the
victim concerning a suggestive logo inscribed on the victim's jacket
at the time of the alleged incident.
25
The trial court granted the state's motion in limine, which ex-
cluded both the landlady's testimony and the defendant's desired
line of cross-examination.2 6 On appeal, the defendant raised a sixth
amendment defense arguing that his right to confrontation in-
cluded the right to cross-examine and introduce relevant evidence
necessary for his defense.2 7
The Montana Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the lower
court, reasoning that "[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a crimi-
nal the right to testimony of witnesses in his favor. However, it
does not guarantee him the right to any and all witnesses, regard-
less of their competency or knowledge."2 8 Following the guidelines
established in Chambers v. Mississippi,2 the Montana Supreme
Court found the prohibitions contained in section 45-5-503(5) of
the Montana Code Annotated and rule 608(b) of the Montana
Rules of Evidence represented a legitimate state interest "to pre-
21. State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1984) (quoting 124 CONG. REc. H11,944
(1978) (statement of Congressman Mann)).
22. 190 Mont. 412, 621 P.2d 1043 (1980).
23. Id. at 415-16, 621 P.2d at 1046-47.
24. Id. at 423, 621 P.2d at 1050.
25. Id. The jacket logo read: "Liquor in the front, and poker in the back." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 422, 621 P.2d at 1050.
28. Id. at 423, 621 P.2d at 1050 (citation omitted).
29. 410 U.S. 284. 295 (1972).
1991]
5
McGuinness: MONTANA'S RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE: NO TIME TO WASTE!
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1991
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
serve the integrity of the trial and to prevent it from becoming a
trial of the victim."30 These restrictions, according to the court, did
not arbitrarily infringe upon the defendant's right to present his
defense."1 Additionally, the court reasoned that testimony concern-
ing the victim's sexual views is admissible under Rule 405(b) of the
Montana Rules of Evidence only when her "'character is in is-
sue' " and " 'central to the outcome of the case."'s2
Higley exemplifies the necessity of rape-shield protection. The
landlady's testimony and the defense's questions about the vic-
tim's jacket, although possibly indicating the victim's general views
on sexual matters, did not indicate whether the victim consented
to the particular sexual :advances of the defendant at the time of
the alleged rape. However, the court's resolution of the constitu-
tional issue concerning the defendant's right to cross-examine the
complainant deserved a much more careful analysis. The United
States Supreme Court has cast a suspicious eye on state eviden-
tiary rules that infringe upon the defendant's right to
confrontation.
33
Two years later, in State v. Lamb,34 the lower court granted
the state's motion in limine, thereby prohibiting the defense from
introducing evidence that the complainant's accusations were "mo-
tivated by a psychological syndrome resulting from a previous sex-
ual assault."35 Without detailing what the offered evidence en-
tailed, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
ruling, relying on Higley's policies and rationale.3 6 The Lamb court
noted that the offered evidence "neither controls the outcome of
the case .. .nor falls within the exceptions of 45-5-503(5).""3 Be-
cause "there was overwhelming evidence supporting the victim's
30. Higley, 190 Mont. at 424, 621 P.2d at 1050-51. Rule 608(b) of the Montana Rules
of Evidence states:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or sup-
porting his credibility, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, how-
ever, in the discretion of the court, if probative of the truthfulness or untruthful-
ness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ....
MONT. R. EvID. 608(b). Higley, a 1980 Montana case, was governed by Montana Code Anno-
tated section 45-5-503(5) and rule 608(b) of the Montana Rules of Evidence. See supra note
13 and accompanying text.
31. Higley, 190 Mont. at 424, 621 P.2d at 1050-51.
32. Id. at 424, 621 P.2d at 1051 (quoting the Commission Comments on rule 405(b) of
the Montana Rules of Evidence) (emphasis added).
33. See infra section V.
34. 198 Mont. 323, 646 P.2d 516 (1982).
35. Id. at 326, 646 P.2d at 518.
36. Id. at 327-28, 646 P.2d at 518-19. See text accompanying supra notes 28 and 30.
37. Lamb, 198 Mont. at 328, 646 P.2d at 519 (emphasis added).
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claim," evidence of her past sexual conduct, according to the court,
was inadmissible.3 8
The implied test that emerges from Lamb places a dangerous
gloss on Montana's Rape-Shield Statute. The trial court may ad-
mit past sexual conduct evidence that would "control the outcome
of the case."3 9 However, in a rape case the victim's character is not
in issue unless the state raises the issue of the victim's character. If
the state does not raise the issue of the victim's character then the
past sexual conduct evidence would not "control the outcome of
the case" and the court should not admit the evidence. Neverthe-
less, if the court does not use this analysis, the broad language of
the Lamb test, "control the outcome of the case," may provide a
dangerously broad exception to the statute that future defense
counsel could use to admit past sexual conduct evidence.
The next attack on Montana's rape shield law occurred in
State v. Anderson," where the defendant was convicted of sexual
assault in the lower court.41 On appeal, the defendant argued that
the court should have admitted evidence concerning a prior sexual
assault charge made by the complainant against a different defend-
ant.4 '2 To attack the complainant's credibility the defendant of-
fered evidence to show that the prosecution had dropped the prior
sexual assault charge before trial.' The defendant argued that the
prosecution's dismissal of the prior sexual assault charge was suffi-
cient to prove that the prior charge was falsely made by the com-
plainant.' Hence, the defendant in Anderson was. claiming that
the sexual assault charge made by the complainant against him
was false, and that the evidence concerning the prosecution's dis-
missal was admissible despite rule 608(b) of the Montana Rules of
Evidence and Montana's Rape-Shield Statute.'5
The Anderson court reasoned that a court must not only find
that the prior claim was already adjudicated to be false,46 but must
also find that the prior claim evidence was only offered to prove
the narrow "issue of the complaining witness' veracity.' 7 The
court refused to admit the defendant's proposed evidence because
38. Id.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. 211 Mont. 272, 686 P.2d 193 (1984).
41. Id. at 276, 686 P.2d at 193.
42. Id. at 281-82, 686 P.2d at 198-99.
43. Id. at 281, 686 P.2d at 198.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 282-83, 686 P.2d at 199-200.
46. Id. at 284, 686 P.2d at 200.
47. Id. (citing Hall v. State, 176 Ind. App. 59, 374 N.E.2d 62 (1978)).
1991]
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it failed to meet these two requirements.
The Anderson court's reasoning also placed a gloss upon Mon-
tana's Rape-Shield Statute. The court affirmed the conviction, but
clearly stated that "limiting or barring a defendant's cross-exami-
nation of a complaining witness in a sex crime case where there is
evidence of prior false accusations restricts the defendant's enjoy-
ment of the worth of his constitutional right to confront
witnesses."48
In another Montana case, State v. Fitzgerald,9 the defendant
was convicted of four counts of sexual intercourse without con-
sent.50 At trial, the defendant attempted to elicit testimony from
the complainant on cross-examination that the victim's friend was
a prostitute. 1 Ultimately, the defendant wanted to show that the
victim was also a prostitute and had fabricated the rape charges
against the defendant to escape punishment from her pimp.52 Pur-
suant to Montana's Rape-Shield Statute, the lower court prohib-
ited this line of questioning. 3
On appeal, the defendant raised a two-pronged attack on
Montana's Rape-Shield Statute. The defendant first argued that,
because he offered the evidence only for the narrow issue of the
witness' veracity, the evidence was admissible under Anderson.5"
The defendant next argued that Montana's Rape-Shield Statute
violated his right of confrontation by unreasonably limiting his op-
portunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
5
The Fitzgerald court used a balancing test finding that the
prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value.
Thus, the evidence was properly rejected by the lower court de-
spite Anderson. 6 The court's reluctance to apply Montana's Rape-
Shield Statute was dangerous because the statute contains explicit
restrictions on past sexual conduct evidence, while the use of this
balancing test leaves the answer to the admissibility question en-
tirely up to the court's best judgment.57 The court also rejected the
defendant's confrontation argument, affirming Higley's policies
48. Id. (citing Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1981)).
49. 238 Mont. 261, 776 P.2d 1222 (1989).
50. Id. at 262, 776 P.2d at 1223.
51. Id. at 263, 776 P.2d at 1223.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 263, 776 P.2d at 1224.
55. Id. at 263, 776 P.2d at 1223. The defendant in Fitzgerald used an argument similar
to the defendant's argument in Higley. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
56. Fitzgerald, 238 Mont. at 264, 776 P.2d at 1224.
57. Compare supra note 3 with supra note 11 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 52
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juveniles and rape victims can suffer if the victims are exploited by
the defense's use of irrelevant evidence during a trial. Both stat-
utes contemplate a crafty defense counsel who attempts to charac-
terize the defendant as a victim and the victim as a defendant.
Both statutes seek to prevent it. Despite these valid considera-
tions, the Davis court implicitly recognized a countervailing funda-
mental right deeply rooted in the constitution. A defendant on
trial risks losing his liberty. It is vital to give the accused a fair
trial-a trial that allows the defendant to present a largely unin-
hibited defense. The Davis court stated, "whatever temporary em-
barrassment might result to Green or his family by disclosure of
his juvenile record-if the prosecution insisted on using him to
make its case-is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into
the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identi-
fication witness."'" The defendant's right to confront adverse wit-
nesses, held to be paramount in Chambers and Davis, provided a
basis for attacking the constitutionality of rape-shield statutes.
VI. RAPE-SHIELD STATUTES UNDER ASSAULT: THE REACTION
MONTANA MUST AVOID
A survey of attacks on federal and state rape-shield statutes,
based on the defendant's right of confr.ontation demonstrates the
applicability of Davis and Chambers to rape-shield laws. 2 Shortly
after Davis, and before the advent of the federal rape-shield stat-
ute in 1978, Oregon faced an attack on its rape-shield statute by a
defendant convicted of attempting to rape a ten-year-old girl.83 At
trial, the defendant attempted to introduce evidence indicating
that the complainant falsely accused him."4 The defendant alleged
that the complainant's motive for bringing the charge stemmed
from her fear that the defendant would tell her parents of her al-
leged sexual activity with a thirteen-year-old boy and her uncle.85
Pursuant to Oregon's rape-shield statute, the lower court prohib-
ited the use of this evidence.86
81. Davis, 415 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added).
82. Although the defendants in Davis and Chambers were not accused of rape, the
reasoning used by both courts is applicable to rape-shield law. These two United States
Supreme Court cases examine the legitimacy of state evidentiary rules in opposition to the
defendant's right to confrontation. See supra notes 65-66, 78 and accompanying text.
83. State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 847, 557 P.2d 1359, 1360 (1976).
84. Id. at 849, 557 P.2d at 1361.
85. Id. at 847, 557 P.2d at 1360.
86. Id. Oregon Revised Statute section 163.475(3) (1976) provided that "evidence of
previous sexual conduct of a complainant shall not be admitted and reference to that con-
duct shall not be made in the presence of the jury." See infra note 90 for the text of Ore-
1991]
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On review, the Oregon Court of Appeals considered whether
the state's interest in protecting a rape victim infringed upon the
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation." The appeals
court held that Oregon's rape-shield statute "infringes upon the
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation as here applied to
prohibit evidence of the complainant's ulterior motive for making a
false charge."88 Without distinguishing between the state interest
at issue in Davis, and the state interest in protecting a rape victim,
the appeals court asserted that "on the facts at bar, however, this
policy must likewise be subordinated to the defendant's constitu-
tional right to confrontation."' 0 The Jalo court's rejection of Ore-
gon's rape-shield statute demonstrates the impact of Davis and
Chambers on rape-shield law. After Jalo, Oregon's statute now al-
lows past sexual conduct evidence not only to show witness bias,
but also if it is "otherwise constitutionally required to be
admitted."' 0
Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not solve this
constitutional dilemma at the federal level. The United States
Court of Appeals in United States v. Nez91 noted that although
little case law had emerged concerning rule 412 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, similar state provisions have come under attack
recently. 2 In Nez, the lower court applied federal rule 412(b) to
prohibit the defendant from introducing evidence of the victim's
past sexual conduct to show witness bias.9
Although the court in Nez affirmed the defendant's conviction,
the court indicated that under Davis the use of evidence of specific
instances of past sexual conduct is admissible to examine the mo-
tive or bias of a witness in a rape proceeding if properly offered
under federal rule 412(b)(1).14 However, the court failed to explore
the ultimate issue, that is, what does "constitutionally required to
be admitted" mean. 8 The court stated that evidence of past sexual
conduct to show motive or bias "is always a proper subject for ex-
gon's current statute.
87. Jalo, 27 Or. App. at 850, 557 P.2d at 1362.
88. Id. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317 (1974)).
89. Id. at 851, 557 P.2d at 1362.
90. OR. REV. STAT. § 412 (1989). Rule 412(2)(b)(a) allows specific instances of past
sexual conduct "if it relates to the motive or bias of the alleged victim." Rule 412(b)(1)
allows the same type of evidence if it is "otherwise constitutionally required to be
admitted."
91. 661 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 1205.
93. Id. at 1204.
94. Id. at 1206.
95. See supra note 15 for the text of rule 412(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
136 [Vol. 52
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amination."9 6 The Nez court's failure to further define the consti-
tutionally required to be admitted language opened the door for
future defendants to expand the Chambers and Davis decisions.
Inevitably, defendants attempted to stretch the Chambers and
Davis holdings to allow defendants to use past sexual conduct evi-
dence for purposes other than showing a witness' motive or bias. In
State v. Calbero,97 a recent Hawaii case, the defendant was con-
victed of sexual assault in a lower court.9 8 On appeal, the defend-
ant raised a two-pronged attack on Hawaii's rape-shield statute, a
statute that is similar to Montana's.
99
At trial, the defendant wished to cross-examine the complain-
ant concerning statements she made as a witness about her sexual
past, and statements she made to the defendant during the alleged
sexual assault.100 The defendant contended that on direct-exami-
nation, when the complainant indicated that "she never consented
to having sex with men, she negated the defendant's consent de-
fense."'' 1 The defendant argued that he could refute her state-
ments using evidence of her past sexual conduct. Additionally, the
defendant argued that any statements made by the complainant to
the defendant during the alleged incident, were admissible to show
the defendant's state of mind at the time of the alleged assault.'0
The defendant's second alleged error dealt with the lower
court's application of Hawaii's rape-shield statute.'0 3 The court
cited Doe v. United States,04 which interpreted federal rule 412 as
not prohibiting the use of the victim's conversation with the de-
fendant to show the defendant's state of mind at the time of the
incident.'0 5 According to the Hawaii Supreme Court in Calbero, "if
the issue is consent, the complaining witness' statements as to her
past sexual experience to the defendant are relevant and should
have been allowed under the statute."' 0 6
In Calbero, the first prong of the defendant's attack presented
a clear conflict between Hawaii's rape-shield statute and the de-
96. Nez, 661 F.2d at 1206.
97. 71 Haw. 115, 785 P.2d 157 (1989).
98. Id. at 116, 785 P.2d at 157.
99. Id. at 124, 785 P.2d at 161; HAW. R. EVID. § 412 (1989). Rule 412 of the Hawaii
Rules of Evidence is identical to federal rule 412. See supra note 15. Compare supra note 15
with supra note 3.
100. Calbero, 71 Haw. at 124, 785 P.2d at 161.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 125, 785 P.2d at 161.
103. Id.
104. 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981).
105. Id. at 48.
106. Calbero, 71 Haw. at 127, 785 P.2d at 162.
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fendant's right to confrontation. The lower court had severely lim-
ited the defendant's ability to cross-examine the complainant's tes-
timony that indicated her lack of prior sexual experience. 10 7 The
Hawaii Supreme Court held that because the rape-shield statute
prevented the defendant from cross-examining the complainant, it
violated the defendant's right of confrontation.
10 8
The Calbero court used Government of Virgin Islands v. Ja-
cobs,10 to reach its decision on the defendant's first attack on Ha-
waii's rape-shield statute. The Jacobs court discussed the constitu-
tional attacks on state rape-shield statutes and rule 412 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, following Chambers and Davis."0 In
both Calbero and Jacobs, the prosecution elicited information
from the complainant about her past sexual conduct to bolster its
own case.' The issue that confronted both courts was whether the
prosecution, having opened the door for the defense to use past
sexual conduct evidence, could close it on the defense by invoking
the rape-shield statute."2
The Jacobs court held that rule 412(b)'s constitutional excep-
tion allows the defendant to impeach the complainant with prior
sexual conduct evidence when the prosecution first opens the
door." 3 The court was influenced by the Davis holding in reaching
this decision."' 4 Similarly, the court in Calbero held that the de-
fendant's confrontation right mandated a favorable ruling for the
defendant." 5 The Calbero court also held that the rape-shield stat-
ute, as applied by the lower court to prevent the defendant from
questioning the complainant about her past sexual conduct once
the state opened the door, was unconstitutional."'
Many state statutes specifically allow the defendant to use
past sexual conduct evidence if the state first opens the door by
107. Id. at 119, 785 P.2d at 158-59:
108. Id. at 127, 785 P.2d at 161.
109. 634 F. Supp. 933 (D.V.I. 1986) (Jacobs is a federal case in which the court con-
fronted issues similar to those confronted by the Calbero court in interpreting federal rule
412.).
110. Id. at 938-39.
111. Id. at 935. See also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
112. Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. at 935.
113. Id. at 940.
114. The Jacobs court noted an important factor present in Davis. The defendant was
prohibited from cross-examining a. crucial state's witness; a witness that the prosecution
relied on to prove its case against the defendant. Id. at 938. Therefore, the Jacobs court
stated that "the concern of the Davis court exists in every rape case where the alleged vic-
tim is the prosecution's key witness. Her credibility is crucial to the issue of whether the
rape occurred." Id.
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using past sexual conduct evidence to support its own case."1 7
Other state and federal courts have carved out this exception to
their rape-shield statutes in case law.' 18 Courts have also faced sit-
uations in which the defense intends to use past sexual conduct
evidence to establish the defense of consent, even though the pros-
ecution has not opened the door. The following case exemplifies
such a situation and indicates the views of the newest United
States Supreme Court Justice.
In State v. Colbath,"9 the defendant wished to introduce evi-
dence that showed that on the day of the alleged rape, the com-
plainant engaged in publicly suggestive acts with a group of men
that included the defendant.1 2 0 The defendant argued that this
conduct showed the complainant expressed her consent to sexual
activity with the defendant. 21 The lower court prohibited the de-
fendant from introducing this evidence pursuant to New Hamp-
shire's rape-shield statute. 2 ' New Hampshire's rape-shield statute
bars all evidence of "prior consensual sexual activity between the
victim and any other person other than the defendant."' 2 The jury
subsequently convicted the defendant of aggravated felonious
assault. 24
Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion for the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court that reversed the lower court's evidentiary
ruling, creating a new exception to New Hampshire's rape-shield
statute that accommodated the defendant's constitutional right of
confrontation. 25 Justice Souter noted that "despite the statute's
absolute terms" its application is limited by the defendant's right
117. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1990); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (Consol.
1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14(2) (1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 750 (1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020(4) (1990); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-
11(b) (1989).
118. State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 29, 545 P.2d 946, 953 (1976);
Commonwealth v. McKay, 363 Mass. 220, 294 N.E.2d 213 (1973); State v. Williams, 21 Ohio
St. 3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986); State v. Camara, 113 Wash. 2d 631, 781 P.2d 483 (1989).
But see Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 246 S.E.2d 363 (1978); State v. Sandoval, 135
Ill. 2d 159, 552 N.E.2d 726, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 343 (1990).
119. " 130 N.H. 316, 540 A.2d 1212 (1988) (Souter, J.).
120." Id..at 317, 540 A.2d at 1213.
121, Id.
122. Id. at 321, 540 A.2d at 1215; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1988).
123. Colbath, 130 N.H. at 321, 540 A.2d at 1215. The statute remains unchanged and
states: "prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the
actor shall not be admitted into evidence in any prosecution under this chapter." N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1989).
124. Colbath, 130 N.H. at 317, 540 A.2d at 1212.
125. Id. at 325, 540 A.2d at 1217. The new exception to New Hampshire's rape-shield
statute allows evidence of the complainant's publicly suggestive acts, close in time to the
alleged incident, to the defendant or a group to which the defendant belongs. Id.
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of confrontation. 126 To facilitate this process, according to Justice
Souter, the court should use a balancing test that allows the de-
fendant to introduce evidence facially prohibited by the rape-
shield statute "if the defendant demonstrates that the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on the
prosecutrix.
127
In applying this test to Colbath, Justice Souter drew an inter-
esting distinction between the private behavior of the prosecutrix
and her public acts. 128 Essentially, Justice Souter argued that evi-
dence of the victim's publicly suggestive acts was less likely to
cause prejudice to the complainant than evidence concerning her
private acts. Justice Souter added a corollary to this distinction
stating that "evidence of public displays of general interest in
sexual activity can be taken to indicate a contemporaneous recep-
tiveness to sexual advances that cannot be inferred from evidence
of private behavior with chosen sex partners."12 9 In other words,
what a complainant does in the public view is more probative than
prejudicial and, therefore, is more likely admissible than evidence
of private acts. What a complainant does in private, with partners
she freely chooses, fails the same balancing test and is less likely to
be admitted.
Justice Souter attempted in Colbath to qualify the rather
broad exception the decision created.1 30 First he noted that the
facts of Colbath made the evidence offered by the defense particu-
larly probative to the consent defense. The defendant's girlfriend
allegedly interrupted the defendant and complainant and engaged
the complainant in a violent fit of jealousy.131 Therefore, as Justice
Souter's opinion stated, "with a motive for the complainant to
make a false accusation, the outcome of the prosecution could well
have turned on a very close judgment about the complainant's atti-
tude of resistance or consent."' 32 Arguably though, the importance
Justice Souter attached to the fact that the complainant may have
had a motive to bring the claim against the defendant expands
126. Id. at 323, 540 A.2d at 1216.
127. Id. (citing State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 59, 426 A.2d 457, 461 (1981)) (emphasis
added). See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of State v. Fitzgerald,
238 Mont. 261, 776 P.2d 1222 (1989). Note the interesting parallels in the reasoning of Jus-
tice Souter and the Montana Supreme Court. This probative value versus prejudicial effect
balancing test appears nowhere in the clear language of the New Hampshire and Montana
rape-shield statutes.
128. Colbath, 130 N.H. at 323, 540 A.2d at 1216.






Montana Law Review, Vol. 52 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/8
MONTANA'S RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE
and rationale."' The Fitzgerald court found it unnecessary to
weigh the interest of the state in protecting the victim against the
defendant's right of confrontation. If the defendant's right to con-
frontation and the state's interest in protecting the victim at a
rape trial clash in the future, it is not clear what course the Mon-
tana Supreme Court will follow. By examining the struggles exper-
ienced by other jurisdictions in the rape-shield area, however,
Montana can maintain the strictest rape-shield protection, while
still providing the defendant with a fair trial.
V. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT STRATEGY: THE DAVIS AND CHAMBERS
DILEMMA
The United States Supreme Court has examined the conflict
between a state's criminal evidentiary rule and the defendant's
constitutional right of confrontation. 9 Defense attorneys consist-
ently use Chambers v. Mississippi ° and Davis v. Alaska6 l when
attacking the constitutionality of rape-shield laws.62 In Cham-
bers, 3 the defendant, convicted of murder in the lower court, chal-
lenged Mississippi's voucher rule64 alleging it prevented him from
effectively cross-examining a state's witness.6 6 The defendant also
attacked Mississippi's hearsay rule, which the defendant alleged
prevented him from calling witnesses potentially damaging to the
state's case." The United States Supreme Court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction, holding that "the State's refusal to permit
[the defendant] to cross-examine [the state's witness], denied him
a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due
process. "67
However, the Court's decision in Chambers did not absolutely
preclude a state from establishing evidentiary rules in opposition
58. Fitzgerald, 238 Mont. at 264, 776 P.2d at 1224. See text accompanying supra notes
28 and 30.
59. However, the United States Supreme Court has never examined the constitution-
ality of a state or federal rape-shield statute. See State v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159, 552
N.E.2d 726, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 343 (1990).
60. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
61. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
62. Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHIo ST.
L.J. 1245, 1248 (1989).
63. 410 U.S. at 284.
64. Id. at 294. The voucher rule "require[s] a party to vouch for the credibility of
witnesses he brought before the jury to affirm his veracity. Having selected them especially
for that purpose, the party might reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their testi-
mony." Id. at 296.
65. Id. at 294.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 302.
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to the defendant's right to confrontation. 8 The Court stated that
"the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and
may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process."69 Therefore, courts must
"closely examine" whether the state's interest in shielding the rape
victim in a rape trial is a legitimate interest under the Chambers
rationale. 0
Another United States Supreme Court case, Davis v. Alaska,71
involved a state interest similar to the state interest underlying
rape-shield statutes. 2 In Davis, the defendant, on trial for burglary
and grand larceny, wished to cross-examine a key state witness to
show the witness had a motive or bias in testifying against the de-
fendant.73 To do this, the defense needed to use information con-
tained in the witness's juvenile record.7' The record revealed that
the witness was on probation for burglary when the witness pro-
vided information to the police implicating the defendant.76 The
lower court prohibited the defendant from disclosing the witness's
juvenile record.7 6 An Alaska statute protects juvenile delinquents
by prohibiting the use of juvenile records in a criminal trial.
7
In reviewing the case, the United States Supreme Court
weighed the state's interest in keeping juvenile records confidential
against the defendant's right to effectively cross-examine the
state's witness. 8 The Court overturned the lower court's ruling,*
holding that "in this setting we conclude that the right of confron-
tation is paramount to the state's policy of protecting a juvenile
offender.
7
The policies underlying the state's interest in protecting a ju-
venile at trial are similar to those that seek to protect a rape vic-
tim at trial.80 Statutes that protect juveniles and statutes that pro-
tect rape victims anticipate the unnecessary humiliation that
68. Id. at 302-03.
69. Id. at 295 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972)) (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
72. Id. at 319.
73. Id. at 311.
74. Id. at 310.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 312-13.
77. Id. at 310-11.
78. Id. at 319.
79. Id.
80. See Commonwealth v. Black, 337 Pa. Super. 548, 487 A.2d 396 (1985). The Black
court stated: "we find the juvenile statutes in Davis and the Rape Shield Law in this case
strikingly similar." Id. at 557, 487 A.2d at 400.
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rather than narrows the publicly suggestive acts exception created
in Colbath. The complainant's alleged motive arose from a private
incident and was thus unrelated to her alleged suggestive acts. Be-
cause Justice Souter emphasized the complainant's alleged motive
to bring a false charge against the defendant, Justice Souter may
have actually created a second exception to New Hampshire's
rape-shield statute that allows past sexual conduct to show the
complainant had a motive to bring a false charge against the
defendant.
The closeness in time between the alleged rape incident and
the complainant's alleged suggestive acts was also important to
Justice Souter. He stated that "evidence that the publicly inviting
acts occurred closely in time to the alleged sexual assault by one
such man could have been viewed as indicating the complainant's
likely attitude at the time of the sexual activity in question." 3 '
However, the fact that the complainant's suggestive acts occurred
near the time of the alleged rape proves little about her attitude
toward the defendant's unsolicited sexual advances during the only
relevant time, that is, when the alleged rape occurred. Further-
more, the complainant's alleged suggestive acts were made to a
group that included the defendant, and not to the defendant
himself.
Justice Souter's decision merits comment, particularly in light
of the similarity between the New Hampshire rape-shield statute
and Montana's."' New Hampshire's rape-shield statute, similar to
Montana's rape-shield statute, contains no provision for the de-
fendant's right to confrontation. Instead, both statutes ban all evi-
dence of a complainant's past sexual conduct with a few narrow
exceptions, leaving no discretion to the court. To comply with Da-
vis and Chambers, courts are tempted to and do create piecemeal
exceptions to prohibitive rape-shield statutes that consider the de-
fendants' constitutional rights despite the statutes' "absolute
terms. 13' 5 The Colbath decision illustrates that a judicially con-
ceived exception to a rape-shield statute can be so broad that a
court can transform an unduly prohibitive rape-shield statute into
an unduly permissive one.
133. Id.
134. Compare supra note 3 with supra note 123.
135. Colbath. 130 N.H. at 323. 540 A.2d at 1216.
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VII. A SYNTHESIS OF JUDICIAL APPROACHES IN APPLYING RAPE-
SHIELD STATUTES
The state and federal cases previously discussed employ two
general approaches. Combining these two general approaches with
Montana's current rape-shield statute will help prevent piecemeal
unraveling of Montana's statute. The first approach allows the
court to elevate the state's interest in protecting a rape victim to a
level that overrides the defendant's constitutional right of confron-
tation in all circumstances except those enumerated in the statute.
A court following this approach would simply apply the rape-shield
statute more mechanically than those courts surveyed in the previ-
ous section.
The second approach is to construct statutes containing elabo-
rate exceptions to general bans on past sexual conduct evidence.13 6
Such statutes would be designed to solve all possible problems
caused by using evidence of a rape victim's past sexual conduct.'37
This approach allows the court to use more discretion than the
first approach, but still requires the court to fit offered evidence
into a statute's cubbyholes of exceptions.
The advantages of the first approach are immediately appar-
ent. A court that seeks to severely restrict the admissibility of past
sexual conduct evidence can rely on the legislative mandate in the
rape-shield statute. By doing so, the court avoids carving out ex-
ceptions on a case-by-case basis as exemplified by the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court in Colbath.'38 In rejecting the defendant's
constitutional attacks, courts using the first approach could argue
that rape-shield statutes separate rape proceedings from other
criminal proceedings. In support of this argument, the court could
state that the legislature has determined that statutes providing
special evidentiary rules in a rape case are necessary for a variety
of policy reasons, and that the court must mechanically apply the
statute to comply with this legislative intent.
The special evidentiary rules provided by a rape-shield statute
will conflict with traditional rules of evidence because they may
prohibit the defendant from introducing certain types of evidence
otherwise admissible. A court that creates exceptions not provided
by the statute to accommodate the defendant's right to confronta-
tion is attempting to make the rape-shield statute compatible with
other rules of evidence in derogation of the legislature's intent.
136. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
137. Id.
138. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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The fundamental policy underlying rape-shield protection is that a
rape victim needs protection beyond that afforded by traditional
rules of evidence and, consequently, the rape-shield statute must
provide special evidentiary rules. To successfully implement the
first approach, a court must justify the state's interest in protect-
ing the victim as a legitimate limitation on the defendant's right to
confrontation. Following this approach, one state court using the
Chambers test,139 stated that "the defendant's right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses concerning the victim's past sexual
behavior with others must bow to accommodate the state's interest
in the Rape-Shield Statute. ' 14 0 In Harris v. State, the Georgia Su-
preme Court noted the special policies underlying rape-shield stat-
utes, and the particular potential for abuse that past sexual con-
duct evidence presents in a rape trial.
14 1
One underlying policy that distinguishes the state's interest
expounded by rape-shield statutes from other state interests is the
history of judicial and societal prejudice against rape victims.
Before rape-shield laws, courts routinely allowed evidence of the
complainant's sexual past.1 42 Courts allowed defense counsel to at-
tack the complainant's character by painting a picture of promis-
cuity for the jury, even though this picture did not contribute to
the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
4 3
The societal impact of this judicial prejudice was to discourage
rape victims from reporting their attacks.14" Quite understandably,
today, women are reluctant to report and prosecute a sex crime if
the potential for humiliation exists.14 5 Therefore, mindful of the
intense atmosphere of a rape trial and the tendency for past sexual
conduct evidence to inflame and distract a jury, individual states
created rape-shield protection.14 6 In passing rape-shield statutes,
the states wanted to encourage women to report and prosecute
what may be the most under-reported crime of our day 1 4
139. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1972). The Chambers test analyzes
whether prohibiting the defendant from using certain types of evidence "would deny him a
fair trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process." Id. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text.
140. Harris v. State, 257 Ga. 666, 669, 362 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1987).
141. Id.
142. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 4, at 549.
143. Harris, 257 Ga. at 669, 362 S.E.2d at 213.
144. Berger, supra note 6, at 5.
145. Of course, the emotional trauma experienced by a rape victim may be so strong
that even with the protection afforded by rape-shield statutes, the victim may be unable,
emotionally, to prosecute the rape crime.
146. Harris, 257 Ga. at 669, 362 S.E.2d at 213.
147. Id. "Rape is a grossly under-reported crime. A woman is raped in this country
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Several problems, however, threaten the vitality of an ap-
proach that creates an overriding state interest in protecting the
victim. First, the cases explored above demonstrate that the de-
fendant's right of confrontation is a powerful one. The United
States Supreme Court may overturn a rape-shield statute applied
mechanically even if the defendant's right to confrontation is only
somewhat infringed. 4 8 Thus, the policies underlying rape-shield
statutes are actually threatened by such an approach. The danger
with combining a prohibitive statute with a mechanistic applica-
tion by the court is that if overturned, the court or the legislature
may create an unduly permissive system of rape-shield protection
to prevent further constitutional attacks." 9 Second, the legislature,
by constructing such a prohibitive statute, may find that the court,
like the New Hampshire court in Colbath, will create more excep-
tions to the particular rape-shield statute on a case-by-case basis
to accommodate the defendant's constitutional right of
confrontation.
50
Some states structure their rape-shield statutes to provide
their courts the means to solve this problem. These states exem-
plify the second approach. A statute containing an array of excep-
tions allows the higher state courts to reverse the lower courts' ap-
plication of the statute, rather than labeling the statute as
unconstitutional. 51 One example of such a statute is the Kansas
rape-shield statute that permits the defense to use evidence of the
victim's past sexual conduct that is "relevant to any fact at issue,
such as the identity of the rapist, consent of the victim, and
whether the defendant actually had intercourse with the victim.'
s2
every three minutes, yet only ten percent of the rapes are reported." Rape and Stereotypes,
Boston Globe, July 27, 1990 at 10p.
148. Berger, supra note 6, at 53.
149. See supra notes 90 and 125 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 125.
151. Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); Daniels v. Alaska, 767
P.2d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Baeza v. State, 489 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989); State v. Bressman, 236 Kan. 296, 689
P.2d 901 (1984); State v. Ray, 637 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1982)(en banc); State v. Wattenbarger,
97 Or. App. 414, 776 P.2d 1292 (1989); State v. Oliveira, 576 A.2d 111 (R.I. 1990); State v.
Finley, 300 S.C. 196, 387 S.E.2d 88 (1989).
152. To be admissible under this type of exception, the following state rape-shield
statutes also require that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for
prejudice: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (1988); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Baldwin 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1990); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 750.520j (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 3255
(1989). Missouri's rape-shield statute admits the evidence under this exception without the
additional requirement that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for
prejudice. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.015 (1989).
[Vol. 52144
20
Montana Law Review, Vol. 52 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/8
MONTANA'S RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE
Missouri's rape-shield statute allows the same evidence if it is
"evidence of immediate surrounding circumstances of the alleged
crime, or if the court finds the evidence relevant to a material fact
or issue. ' 15s Some other exceptions states have formulated include:
(1) "evidence of past sexual conduct to impeach the witness credi-
bility",154 (2) evidence used to show an unusual pattern of consen-
sual activity that is closely related to the defendant's account of
the events leading to his claim of consent, 5 ' (3) evidence used to
prove the victim was a prostitute, 1 5 and (4) evidence used "to
show the victim fantasized the event.
15 7
The problem with the second approach is its potential for
abuse. As some of the above exceptions indicate, clever defense at-
torneys can manipulate the exceptions' rather broad language. For
example, the exception allowing past sexual conduct evidence if it
is "relevant to any material issue or fact," deprives the rape-shield
statute of its distinctive function in a rape proceeding because it is
nothing more than a recodification of relevance. 158 The premise be-
hind rape-shield protection, however, is that a rape victim's past
sexual conduct is subject to special evidentiary rules' beyond the
regular rules of evidence discussing relevance. While the first ap-
proach risks exceeding the policies underlying rape-shield laws by
completely depriving the defendant of his right to confrontation,
the second approach retreats excessively from these policies by af-
fording the victim inadequate protection. Montana should blend
the virtues of these two approaches to effectuate the policies un-
derlying rape-shield protection, while also respecting the defend-
ant's position. A middle ground between the first approach's mech-
anistic application of the statute and the second approach's
153. See, e.g., State v. Ray, 637 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1982)(en banc); Mo. REV. STAT. §
491.015 (1989).
154. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1990); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 3255 (1989) (This statute requires that the probative value of the evi-
dence outweighs its potential for prejudice to be admissable.).
155. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (1990);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8c-1, Rule 412 (1990).
156. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1990); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (Consol.
1990).
157. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8c-i, Rule 412 (1990).
158. Compare the language of statutes allowing past sexual conduct evidence that is
"relevant to any fact at issue" with rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which states:
"relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. Allegations that the "relevant to any fact at issue
exception" is buttressed by adding a balancing test of probative value against prejudicial
effect are illusory because traditional rules of evidence already apply such a test to relevant
evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403.
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excessively broad exceptions will withstand constitutional
challenge.
VIII. A SENSIBLE COURSE FOR MONTANA TO CHART
With the comparatively small number of Montana Supreme
Court decisions interpreting Montana's Rape-Shield Statute, it is
impossible to fit our court's present approach into one of the two
approaches outlined above. The decisions do indicate, though, that
the court is sensitive to the Montana Rape-Shield Statute's pro-
hibitive character.159 In the absence of any reference to a constitu-
tional safeguard for the defendant in Montana's Rape-Shield Stat-
ute, the court has mechanically applied the statute, as in the first
approach, to prevent the defendant from using evidence of the vic-
tim's past sexual conduct. The court has done this without serious
consideration to the warnings issued in Davis and Chambers. How-
ever, the court has also shown characteristics of the second ap-
proach by hinting at two possible exceptions to Montana's Rape-
Shield Statute that defense counsel could legitimately use in future
sex crime cases in Montana. 60
The Montana Supreme Court hinted at the first exception to
Montana's Rape-Shield Statute in both Higley and Lamb. If the
evidence involving the complainant's past sexual conduct would
"control the outcome of the case," the court could allow it despite
the rape-shield statute's prohibitions.' However, this exception
finds its roots in rule 608(b) of the Montana Rules of Evidence, a
traditional rule of evidence. The Montana courts must resist the
temptation to retreat to traditional rules of evidence in creating
exceptions to rape-shield statutes if Montana is to preserve its
stringent rape-shield law.
The similarity between the "relevant to any material fact" ex-
ception contained in the Missouri and Kansas rape-shield stat-
utes162 and Lamb's "control the outcome of the case" exception is
159. See supra notes 37, 47-48, 57 and accompanying text.
160. Id. The first exception, implicit in Lamb, would allow past sexual conduct evi-
dence that "would control the outcome of the case." See supra note 37 and accompanying
text. The second exception, formulated in Anderson, would allow evidence of prior false
charges made by the victim that a court has already "adjudicated to be false." See supra
notes 47-48 and accompanying text. The Fitzgerald decision did not create another excep-
tion to the statute. However, the court indicated that it is proper to weigh the probative
value against the prejudicial effect of past sexual conduct evidence despite the absence of
such language in the statute. See supra note 57.
161. State v. Lamb, 198 Mont. 323, 328, 646 P.2d 516, 519 (1982); State v. Higley, 190
Mont. 412, 424, 621 P.2d 1043, 1051 (1980).
162. See supra notes 152 and 153 and accompanying text.
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alarming. The plethora of defense rationales purporting to come
under this undefined Montana exception would be endless.1 63 If
rape-shield statutes must conform to traditional rules of evidence,
then their distinctive protection for rape victims is lost. A nar-
rower, more definable exception, designed specifically to accommo-
date the defendant's right to confrontation, avoids allowing more
past sexual conduct evidence than is necessary. Providing Montana
courts with a narrower, more definable exception to apply would
arm them with adequate discretion to allow past sexual conduct
evidence in those situations mandated by the United States
Constitution."8 '
In Anderson, 65 the court implied another distinct exception to
Montana's Rape-Shield Statute that involved prior sexual offense
charges made by the complainant. Indeed, Anderson stands alone
among Montana cases in recognizing the defendant's right of con-
frontation as potentially paramount to the victim's rights under
Montana's Rape-Shield Statute.16 This second exception, exempli-
fied in Anderson, also reflects the need to give adequate discretion
to the lower court. The court should prohibit the defense from in-
troducing evidence of alleged prior charges that the defense cannot
prove are false. 1 7 Conversely, the complainant should not use the
rape-shield statute to prohibit the defendant from demonstrating
to the court's satisfaction that the complainant made prior false
charges. 68
The Anderson court decided that the lower court should ad-
mit only evidence of prior sex crime charges already adjudicated to
be false' and evidence that could be narrowed to the limited issue
163. Because the language, "control the outcome of the case" is derived from a tradi-
tional rule of evidence, defense counsel would only have to satisfy traditional relevance stan-
dards and not the heightened standards demanded by rape-shield statutes.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
165. State v. Anderson, 211 Mont. 272, 686 P.2d 193 (1984).
166. Id. at 284, 686 P.2d at 200.
167. Id. at 284, 686 P.2d at 201. This is because the defense is offering past sexual
conduct evidence only to give the jury the impression that the victim is sexually
promiscuous.
168. Courts are deeply divided on this issue. See, e.g., U.S. v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34
(6th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Hutchinson,
141 Ariz. 583, 688 P.2d 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal. App. 2d 334,
333 P.2d 82 (1958); Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989); People v. Alexander,
116 Ill. App. 3d 855, 452 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); State v. Oliveira, 576 A.2d 111 (R.I.
1990); State v. Demos, 94 Wash. 2d 733, 619 P.2d 968 (1980). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 3255(a)(3)(c) (1990)(The statute admits "evidence of specific instances of the complaining
witness' past false allegations of violations of this chapter."); WIs. STAT. § 972.11 (2)(b)
(1990) (The statute admits "evidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault made
by the complaining witness.").
169. Anderson, 211 Mont. at 284, 686 P.2d at 200.
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of the witness's veracity. 170 This decision affords too little discre-
tion for the lower court. If, for example, the defendant could show
that the complainant had previously filed several rape charges, all
dropped by the prosecution before trial, the court should have in-
herent discretion to allow the defendant to use this evidence.
1 1
Rape-shield law is legitimate to the extent that it protects an inno-
cent rape victim from needless humiliation at trial. Rape-shield
law is illegitimate when used so blindly that it shields the com-
plainant from her prior false accusations.
The potential for rape-shield protection abuse is most evident
in the illustration of Mr. X in the introductory paragraph. 172 The
prosecution used evidence of the complainant's past sexual con-
duct to buttress its own case. The complainant, to negate the de-
fense of consent, testified that she had no prior sexual experience.
Applied mechanically, Montana's Rape-Shield'Statute would bar
the defendant from introducing evidence of the complainant's past
sexual conduct to counter this maneuver. 17' However, once the
state uses past sexual conduct evidence, the court should possess
inherent discretion to permit the defense to rebut the state's evi-
dence. The defendant is denied a fair trial if the defendant cannot
use evidence to rebut the state's case. The court should place lim-
its on the defendant's introduction of past sexual conduct evidence
even when the state opens the door. Such limits will prevent the
defense from using more past sexual conduct evidence than the
court deems necessary to refute the state's evidence. 74 Such a situ-
ation illustrates why discretion is crucial to provide the defendant
a fair trial, even in a stringent rape-shield protection scheme.
IX. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS: ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL
INSTRUCTIONS ADD OVERALL LEGITIMACY
Montana's Rape-Shield Statute contains a minimal procedural
170. Id. at 284-85, 686 P.2d at 200 (citing Hall v. State, 176 Ind. App. 59, 374 N.E.2d
62 (1978)).
171. This would indicate that the defense is offering the evidence not to show the
victim is sexually promiscuous, but to show the victim promiscuously files false sex crime
charges.
172. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 3. The language of Montana Code Annotated section 45-5-511(5)
(1989) clearly guards against only the defense's use of the evidence. The statute states:
[i]f the defendant proposes for any purpose to use evidence described in subsec-
tion (4) [evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim] the trial judge
shall hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether the
proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (4).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511 (5) (1989).
174. See, e.g., State v. Camara, 113 Wash. 2d 631, 781 P.2d 483 (1989).
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instruction requiring the court to hold a hearing outside the pres-
ence of the jury when the defense intends to introduce evidence of
the victim's past sexual conduct.'7 5 The statute does not require
that the defense make a written motion indicating the purpose for
which the defense will use the evidence. 176 Additionally, the court
is not compelled to make an order outlining specifically what evi-
dence the court will admit and what limits the court will place on
the defense's use of the evidence. 177 These procedural matters are
not just formalities. The court, by controlling the amount and na-
ture of the evidence admitted, can avoid hastily made rulings that
are either too broad or too narrow in scope. A more thorough pro-
cedure that protects the defendant's constitutional rights would
give greater legitimacy to the stringent rape-shield scheme sug-
gested for Montana.
Federal rule 412 requires a written motion from the defense
not later than fifteen days before the start of trial.7 8 The "fifteen-
day requirement can be waived if the court determines the evi-
dence is newly discovered or would have been through the exercise
of due diligence. 1' 79 Accompanying this motion must be a written
offer of proof demonstrating why the evidence qualifies for admis-
sion under the statute. 180 The court should hold an in camera
hearing during which both counsel are permitted to call witnesses,
including the alleged victim, to establish the admissibility of the
evidence.1"'
This article will suggest a scheme that commits Montana
courts to stringent rape-shield protection. Under the scheme, Mon-
tana courts gain greater discretion than is now afforded under
Montana's Rape-Shield Statute. 182 The Montana courts, from the
trial level to the supreme court, must respect Montana's interest in
rape-shield law and refrain from adding any new exceptions to the
statute. New exceptions simply dilute rape-shield protection for
the victim. The cases from other jurisdictions show that no statute,
by itself, anticipates all the conflicts that can arise between rape-
shield law and the defendant's confrontation rights. This scheme
discourages the piecemeal creation of broad exceptions to the rape-
shield statute illustrated in Colbath. Instead, Montana courts will
175. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (1990).
176. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1).
177. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3).
178. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1).
179. Id.
180. FED. R. EViD. 412(c)(2).
181. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1), (3).
182. See infra part (2) of proposed statute.
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receive inherent power to accept past sexual conduct evidence in
those situations clearly required by the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution, or situations in which the evidence is
needed to give the defendant a fair trial.
X. PROPOSED MONTANA RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE
l e a
1. Provisions generally applicable to sexual crimes:'8
(a) Evidence of specific instances of conduct, opinion evi-
dence, reputation evidence, relating to the alleged victim's sex-
ual conduct before the alleged attack shall be inadmissible.
However, the evidence is automatically admissible if it qualifies
as:
(b) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the
offender. 185
(c) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual con-
duct to show the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease which is
at issue in the prosecution.186
2. In addition to the exceptions contained in (1)(b) and (c), the
court in its sound discretion may admit evidence of the nature
contained in subsection (1)(a) in those circumstances where the
evidence is so probative that to prohibit the evidence would deny
the defendant a fair trial or deprive him of his constitutional
right of confrontation.
1 87
3. If either the accused or the victim intends to introduce evi-
dence of the nature contained in subsection (1)(a), the party
shall file a written motion to the court not less than fifteen days
before the trial date.188 The fifteen day requirement may be
waived if the party satisfies the court that the evidence is newly
discovered or would have been in the exercise of due diligence.1 89
The motion shall be served on all parties involved.1 90 The motion
shall contain the nature of the evidence sought to be introduced
by the party.1 9' If, during an in camera hearing, the court deter-
mines that the evidence is admissible under this section, the
court shall make a written order detailing any limits it deems
necessary on the scope of such evidence.
92
183. Compare Proposed Montana Rape-Shield Statute with supra note 3.
184. See supra note 3.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 9a.44.020(3)(d) (1989) and CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-
86f(4) (1989) with section 2 of proposed statute.
188. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. FED. R. EVD. 412(c)(2).
192. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3).
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Montana is fortunate because it has avoided major challenges
to its rape-shield statute. However, by reviewing the attacks exper-
ienced in other states, it is apparent that Montana's Rape-Shield
Statute is susceptible to serious constitutional challenges. This ar-
ticle is an exercise in preventative law, by preparing the Montana
courts for an inevitable constitutional attack. From the experience
of other jurisdictions, Montana can learn and minimize its own
struggle with rape-shield law.
Under this article's proposed rape-shield scheme, Montana's
method of protecting the rape victim considers the defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation by meeting the standards set
forth in the Davis and Chambers decisions. 193 With the discretion
afforded the court, coupled with the procedural safeguards, the de-
fendant's legitimate rights to a fair trial are adequately protected.
In addition, this proposed rape-shield scheme keeps intact the
rape-shield protection provided by Montana's current rape-shield
statute. A thoughtful implementation of this scheme will en-
courage the reporting and prosecution of one of society's most
emotional crimes by providing a compassionate atmosphere for the
victim and a flexible truth-finding forum for the accused.
193. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
295 (1973). The U.S. Supreme Court recently commented on Davis, stating:
It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry
into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges re-
tain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose rea-
sonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or inter-
rogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).
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